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INsuneNcs CoNSUMER CouNsprts CorunrN
TrrB "DtscRETroNARy CrausE" rr.r ERISA HBar,rH lNsun¡Ncn Pr¡Ns
¡v Pno¡'¡sson Gnrc Mwrtxo'l
Introduction
ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Secudty Act of 1974,2
was instituted by Congtess to standardrze the health, retirement, and
disabiJity plans offered by private
employers in the United States. For
plaintìffs' lawyers, the Act may be

most notable for its express preemption of stâte common law remedies
for denial, reduction, or termination
of benefìts promised under employer-sponsoted plans. Any cause of
actjon regarding such benefit decisions can only be based on equitable
remedies provided in the ,A.ct itself.
\Øhile the Act does not allow the
compensâtory and punitive damages

which are standard tools for statecourt remedy of violations of insurer
prornises, it does provide for a reasonable attorney fee in some cases
where the employee prevails against
an ERISÄ plan. Not surprisingl¡
ERIS,\ is commonly viewed as the
bane of existence for lawyer's reptesenting injured persons who must
depend on benefits from an ERISrq.
plan, and not without justifìcation.
A key feature of ERIS,{ plans in
the past decade has been the "discretionaty clause," a provision that purports to confet on the ERISA plan
administrator or insurer dre poweq in
its sole discretion, to determine eligi-

bility for bene{ìts and to interpret the
terms and provisions of the plan
policy. Because federal courts have
elected to treat the administratoïs'

in exercising such discretion as equivalent to administrative
decisions

decisions of government agencies,
they have tended to limit judicial
review by applying a standard requiring deference to the decision except
in cases of abuse of discretion.3 The
end result is that one party to the
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contract, the plan administrator, has
significant power to determine terms
of the contract after the inception of
the contract. The insuted must appeal
to the plan and can only achieve
redress of grievances ìn court if he
or she can show abuse of discretion.
Notably, this process means the insured never had the use of any discovery, such as a depositìon, to
inquire how the denial decision was
made in the fìrst place.
Unfortunately, in 1989, the
Supreme Court in Fire¡tone Tire dy
Røbber Co. u. Brach,a approved the use

of

discretionary clauses in health, life,
and disability employer-sponsored
bene{ìt plans. This coupled with
holdings that decisions under the
discretionary clause would be reviewed undet an abuse-of-discretion
standarcì meant that the benefits
decisions of private insutance companies were being accorded the same
deference as decisions of agencies of
the executive branch of government.
In2006, the then Insurance
Commissioner fot the State of Montana, John Morrison, prohibited the
use of the discretionary clause in
employer-based plans in Montana. He
concluded, under the language of
MCA S 33-1,-502Q) that such clauses
are "inconsistent, ambiguous and
misleading" and "deceptively affects

the risk purported to be assumed in
the general coverage of the contract"
so âs to render the clauses violative
of the statute. \X/hjle ERISÂ preempts state law as it appJies to
ERISA plans, the Äct provides ân
exceptìon for "regulation of the business of insurance" and Morrison
acted under that cxception.
Motrison-was not alone in
banning discretionary clauses. In
2002, the National ,A.ssociation of

Insurance Commissioners Q.JAIC)
had adopted Model Act 42 tided
"Prohibition on the Use of Discretionary Clauses Model Act." The
Nr{JC recommended that its members initiate legislation to prohibit
clauses that purport to "teserve discrefion to the health carúer to interpret the terms of the conúact, or to
provide standards of interpretation or
review that are inconsistent with the
laws of the state." Commissioners in
states including New

York

(2006),5

Cahfornta (2004),6 and Illinois
Q00 5),7 prohibited discretionary
clauses in the plans.

The Commissioner, John
Mofrison, was sued by the industry
in federal court in Montana but won
summary judgment in Judge Molloy's
court. The case was appealed to the
9ù Circuit and. may someday reach

the United States Supteme Court.
The issue of the pov/er of state insurance commissioners to regulate
the use of the discretionary clause is
of gteat importânce and provides
readers of Trial Trends ân opportunity
to visit the underpinnings of ERIS,\,
the discretionary clause, and thc authority of the Insurance Commissioner. Such a review should assist
plaintiffs' counsel in dealing with the
ever present problems created by
ERISA.

Bacþround of ERISA
By implication, ERISA is very
much a part of the health care debate
in the United States today. Because
the U.S. does not have universal
health care, the major source of
health care coverage in the country
has been sponsored by employers. It
does not appear that any

politicaþ

viable teform of ,A.merican health
care is going to change that. In order
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to encourâge private employers to provide health, disability, and retitement bene{ìts, Congress passed the Employment Income Retirement and Security Act in 1974. \X/hile
a major impetus for the Act was protection and promotion of pension plans, health câre was included. Today, an
estimated 85% of Âmericans receive health câre coverage
from theit employers, though not all of the employmentbased plans are governed by ERIS,{.
In ERISAs preamble, Congress made clear three important intentions: (1) protection of plan participants and
bene{ìciaries by requiring certain ltnancial accounting and
disclosure to them; (2) estabJishing standards of conduct
and responsibiJity for the fìduciaries involved in the plans;
and (3) establishing a system of remedies and sanctions to
enforce rights and obligations under the Act.
The fìrst two intentions and the anti-discrimination
provisions of the ,\ct were aimed at preventing abuses.
The function of the third was to introduce a uniform

strlrcture for the handling of claims arising out of denial,
reduction, or termination of benefits. In order to encourage employers ("plan sponsors') to provide health, disability, and pension benefìts, Congress abrogated the rights of
employees ('plan participants") to bring câuses of action
based in state law against the employers providing the
benefit plans and their insurance companies. Insteacl,
Congress substituted a set of remedies entirely based in
E,RISA.

The Act recognizes "plan administrâtors," often insur-

to benefìt the plan
and employees. The plan sponsor or plan administrator
may delegate administrative duties to a "tlird-party
administratotl' agitn often an insurer, which simply
provides administration for the plan and does not provide
benefìts.
ers which owe a {ìduciary obligation

ERISAfs Preemption of State Law
ERISA provides that "[e]xcept as provided in subsec-

tion þ) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter...

Erinkman

eourt
Reporting,
lnc.
6651Gooch Hill Road, Eozeman

Nationally ecrtlfied Rèport€r taurine Brin kma n
Member of NCRA and MGRA

Phone&Faxr 585-0078
E-mall: lbrink¡lq!!#iqrt net

r
r
r
r
¡
r

eonnputerizedTranseriptÌon

Keword lndex
Condensed CopVãnd E-trãnscr¡pt
Seanned Ëxhibits

Videography
Teleconferenchig- when the Witness ls

in Eozeman wlth us, you c¡rn stay in
your off¡cè ãnd save þoth tlme & money

r
r
r

Maximum 10-Bus¡ness Þay Þelivery
Rush and ËxpÈdited

llelivery Available

Êomplimentary eonference Room
5 Minutes from North 7th Ex¡t

r
Pecs 32

e¡mpare Qur Rates.q.FC..Ç$tY e

shall supercede any and all state laws insofar as they may
rìow or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. .,."8
A classic example of the import of that preemptìon can
be seen in the treatment Montana's "made-whole" rule
with regard to insurer subrogation. Since 1977, tn Skøwge
u. Moantain Stater'1-e/. dy Te/. Co.,e the Montana Supreme
Court has held that an insurer carìnot claim subrogation
until the insured has recovered the insured's entire loss
including costs and âttorney fees.lo This is known as the
"made-whole" rule. Insurance subrogation and the madewhole rule are creations of the state courts. In the case
of ERISA plans, such common law is preempted.ll The
9ù Circuit Court of ,\ppeals, in 1994, adopted the madewhole rule for ERIS,\ plans in Barnes u. Independent Auto
Dealers Ass'n of CaQfornia Heahh and IYefare Berueft Plan,12
but said, "absent an agreement to the cotttrîúy, an insutance company may not enforce a right to subrogation
untjl the insured has been fully compensated for her injuries, that is, has been made whole." Unfortunately, the
câse was an open invitation to the plan drafters to make
each plan "aî agteement to the corrlraty," ancl it is common today that plans expressly provide that the plan gets
full subrogation tegatdless of whether the insured has
been made whole. The unjust result can be seen in the
federal court decisionin Marqais u. Ironwor/<ers Intermowntain Heahh and IYefare Tra¡t Fønd13 where the ERISA
health plan language expressly abrogated the made-whole
doctrine. There Judge Molloy decried the fact that Circuit
precedent forced him to allow the insurer to collect
$317,000 subrogatìon from an $800,000 total tort
recovery of a worker rendered quadriplegic.
More importantly, state law of insurance bad faith and
the accompanying claims for relief and remedies such as
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punitive damages are preempted
undet ERISA wder Pilot Life u.

of plan administratots and fiduciaries' decisions similat to the ones

Dedeaax la and Aetna Health Inc. u.
Dauila.1s Preemption of state laws
and remedies effectìvely removes any

placed on judicial review of governmental agency action, even though,

meaningful sanctions and severely
restricts the incentive for an ERISÂ
plan administrator's failure to meet
the full benefit obligations owed to

cies, administrâtors and fìduciaries
are not answerable to the public or to
elected offìcials." As John Garamendi

noted

their insureds.

for the State of California, "This

unlike officials in govetnmental agen-

as Insurance Commissioner

Claims by the fnsured Employee
Under ERISA Plans
The ERISA plans provide for
an internal process for appeal of
benefit decisions. This generally requires the employee to appeal to an
entity or person involvecl with the
plan administrator. The employee
aggrieved by a benefits decision will
fìle any necessary medical records or
other evidence supporting his or her
position. ERISA provides for notice
of decisions but does not provide for
a'hearing in such appeals. Nevertheless, the insured must exhaust this

appeù process just as claimants in

the admrnistrative system of the
executive btanch must exhaust
administrative remedies before
fiLing in a Federal district court.
If the administrator denies the
claim on appeal, the insured can {ile
an action based in the ¡{.ct for statutory relief. The insured cânnot file a
breach of contrâct claim or other
common law legal claim.
Most importantly, where the plan
contains a discretionary clause, the
standard of judicial review on appeal
to a district court is not de nouo.'[he
cou-rts have treated the discretion the
ERISA plan grants itself much lìke
the discretion of government administrative agencies. Consequently, the
courts grant deference to the decision
of the plan and can only reverse the
decision of the administrator on a
finding of abuse of discretion. ,\s the
Federal District Court in Massachusetts said in Radþrd Trøst u. UNUM
Life Ins. Co. of Americø,16 Congress

placed "limitations on judicial review

Tru¡r TnnNos

-

SpnrNc 20L0

of

review deprives California insureds of access to the protections in the Insurance Code and in
standard

California

construed to exempt ot relieve any
person from any law of any State

which regulates ìnsurance."2O Hence,
state laws regulating the business of
insutance sutvive the broad federal
preemption of ERISA.

Underpinning the savings clause
is 150 years of alegal tradition in
which the insurance industry has
been regulated by the states and not
the federal government.

In

1869, the

United States Supreme Court held in
PaøJ u. Virginìa,21 that issuance

Law."17

The Third Circuit,

"nothing in this chapter shall be

'tn

Brach

Firestone Tire dv Rabber C0.18 said

of

policies of

u.

that

the arbitrary and capricious standard
originated with the Labor Management Relations ¿{.ct but noted that,

of the LMRÂ requiremcnts, there was a certain assurancc
of impartiality of the trustees in
those plans. The Bruclt court noted
that, in any unfunded plan run erì-

by nature

tirely by the employer, "every dollar
provided in benefìts is a dollar spent
by defendant Firestone, the employer;
and every dollar saved by the administrator on behalf of his employer is
a dollar in Firestone's pocket." The
court questioned judicial deference to
such decisions undet an abuse-ofdiscretion standard because of the
inherent conflict of interest.
Hawaü, whìle permittìng the
discretionary clause, stripped decisions under that clause from the
deference standard and specified that
udiciat review of decisions made
f
under discretionary clauses are subject to de nouo review:1e This allows
the insured discovery and a full tdal
on the merits.

ERISAIs "Savings Clause" and
the Tradition of State Regulation
of Insurance
ERISAs express and sweeping
preemption of state common law in
favot of a unifotm fedetal structure
for resolving claims for denial, reduction, or termination of benefìts has a
"savings" clause, which provides that

insurance were not transactions in commerce, reasoning that
they were not traded or bartered in a
mafket and were not "articles of
commerce in any proper meaning of
the word," or "commodities to be
shipped from one state to another."
Consequendy, Congress could not
regulate insurance undet the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Moreoveq it was impJicit when Congress enacted the antitrust provisions
in the Sherman Act in 1890 that the

provisions would not apply to insurance. ,{.s a tesult, there developed a
system of state regulation of the
insurance industry. That system had
a national as opposed to fedetal
aspect insofar as there was cooperation between the states through the

growing National ,\ssociation of
Insutance Commissioners.
However, in 1944, the Supreme
Court rocked the insurance industry

in

United StaÍes u. Soutb-Easlern IJnder-

wriÍers As¡ociation by

holdtng that

transactions of an insurance rating
bureau and its membet companies
which were alleged to constitute
boycotts and antitrust violations
could be regulated under the Commerce Clause.2z The overruling of
Paal u. Vzrgìnia and its implications

for the'ìndustry caused Congtess, .i
at the behest of the N,A.IC and the
industr¡ to enact the McCarranFerguson Act in L945.23 McCananFerguson expressly provided for the
continued tegulation

of

the business
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insurance by the several states to
the exclusion of the federal government.2a McCarran-Fetguson also
provided that the Sherman Act would
apply only to agfeements to boycott,
coerce, or intimiclate.2s Consequendy,
insurance today is regulated by the
states, although the system may be
described as "national" regulation in

of the coordinated efforts of
the NAIC, the orgarization of the
state insurance commissioners, especiaþ the promotion of uniform laws
and regulations by that group.

light

The Tension Between State
Regulation of Insutance ând
ERISA Preemption of State Law
ERISA mandates that, in cases

of benefit disputes,

all state remedies
avitlable to the insured (i.e., breach
of conúact, bad faith, and negligent
representation) are preempted, and
the insured is limited to the remedies
specifìed in the Act. It then excepts
from this preemption any state law
that regulates insurance. As Judge
Molloy said in deciding Standard
Joltn Morrison,
"...when federal law provides a uni-

Insarance Conparry

u.

form regulatory and enfotcement
scheme while simultaneously and
expressly recognizing a space within
this scheme for state governments to
'regulate insurance,' the question
becomes one of fìt between the state
fnsurance Commissionet's action and
the federal statutofy scheme Congress has established."26 The tension
arises when an insurance commissioner acts to regulate an ERISA plan
under a state law regulating insurance

with the expectation thai it will fall
under the savings clause, whjle the
ERISA plan expects that it is free
from the act under ERISAs inhetent
preemption. The dispute ovet the

United

States Judge for the Northern
District of ,{labama writing in a law
review article describes ERISA as
"beyond redemptìon" saying that

in question, and claims admin-

"Occasionally a statute comes along
that is so poody contemplated by the
draftspersons that it cânnot be saved
by judicial interpretation, innovation,
or manipulation. It becomes a
litigant's plaything ancl a judge's
nightmare. ERISA falls into this

istrators may receive deferential stanclatd of review: The
economic impact on Provident
from having policies covered
by ERIS,\ could be signifìcant.
As an example, Glenn Felton
identifìed 12 claim situarions
where we settled for $7.8 million in the aggregate. If these
12 cases had been covered by

category."z1 The 7'h Circuit ques-

ERISA, our liability would

tioned why the United States
Supreme Court cleterminecl that

have been betq/een zero and

Of

u.

D aui/a,3o interpreted "state regulation

of insurance" nartowly

enough to
involving
exclude claims
bad faith
and punitive damages. Judicial determination that bad faith insurance
suits are not "tegulation of insurance" protected from ERISTA. pre-

wherever possible.

Standard fnsutance Company's
Discretionaty Clauses
Standard is an insurance company organtzed in Oregon and authoitzed to sell disabiliry accidental
death and dismemberment poJicies.
The company has historically included discretionaty clauses in both
ERIS,A. and non-ERISA policies.

savings clause. The stakes are erìormous as is best illustrated by an internal memo of Provident Insurance

In2005, when Morrison ordered
Standard to remove the clauses, the
compâny elected instead to
a
^tta;ch
rider entitled a "Gtattt of Discretion"
which, by its terms only applied to
the ERISA policies. In 2006,
Morrison disapproved the "Gtant
of Discretiofl" clauses, and Standard
filed separate actions in state and
federal court in Montana seeking
injunctive ancl declaratory reJief
under the allegation that ERISA

Company of October 2, 1,995.31
There an execu[ivc writes:

preempted any legal authority the
commissioner may have had to

emption means the plans have way
less economic incentive to pay claims.
Inevitably then, the plans and
their insureds are going to square off
on the issue of whether the state
regulation supporting the insured's
position is state regulation of insurance within the meaning of the Act's

regulate the clauses.

The advantages of ERIS'\
coverâge in litigious situations

perfectly.

Coufts too afe exasperated by
ERISA and the issues it provokes.

damages. Relief is usually lim-

Judge \X/illiam Acker, Jr., Senior

ited to the amount of benefit
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The executive inveighs personnel
to identify and initiate modifìcation
of plans to be covered under ERISA

particular importance to

insurers is the fact that the United
States Supreme Court, in Pilot Life
Dedeaøx2e and Aetna Health Inc. u.

are enofmous: stâte law is preempted by federal law, there
are no jury trials, and there are

discretionary clauses illusftates this

$0.5 million.

disputes between employees and
insurance companies over the mearling of contract terms were disputes
under ERISA to be resolvecl in
Federal Courts.28

no compensatory or punitive

The Authority of the Montana
Insutance Commissioner to
Regulate Insurance Provisions
The Commissioner of Insurance
in Montana has the authority to enforce the insurance code in the state,
and accordingly, the authority to

Tru¡r TneNos - Spnrxc 2010

Today we... hold that for a state law to be
deemed a "law... which regulates insurance"
under $ 1144þX2X,{), it must satisfy two requirements. First, the state law must be specifì-

regulate insurance. MCA S 33-1-311(1) and (2) provide
that the Commissioner "shall enforce the applicable
provisions of the laws" of the State of Montana and
has "the powers and authority exptessly conferred upon
þim] or reasonably implied from the provisions of
the laws of this state." He is expressly given the duty
of approving or disapproving the forms usecl by the

insurers in the

cally directed toward entities engaged in
insurance. [Citations omitted]. Second, as explained above, the state law must substantially
affect the risk pooJing arrangement between
the insurer and the insured. I(entucky's law

state.32

MCA

S 33-1-502 ptovides that "the commissioner
shall disapprove any form... or withdraw any previous
approval..." if the form "contains...any inconsistent,
ambiguous, or misleadrng clauses or exceptions and

satisfìes each

The first part of the test, whether the state law is
specifìcaþ dìrected toward entities engaged ìn insurance is more often than not the proverbial "flo
brainer." The Supreme Court has held that, "as a
of common sense," a Caltfotnta statute requir'Jilatter
ing insurers to prove prejudice before enforcing
proof-of-claim tequiremerrts wâs directed at such

conditions which deceptiveþ affect the risk purported to
be assumed in the general coverage of the contrâct...
"LJnder this authority, Commissioner John Morrison
disapproved the discretionary clauses in poJicies of
Standatd Insutance Company.

The Test for Determining if the Regulator's Act
is ((State Regulation of Insurancet'
In 2003, the United States Supreme Court in Kentøcþ Ass'ru of Health Plans, Inc. u. Mi//er,33 set forth a tv/opart test for determining whethet sta;te law regulates
^
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\n Røsh Prwdential IIMO, Inc. u. Moran,35
Illinois statute provided for an independent medical
review panel that could review the denials of claims
by an HMO governed by ERISA. llhen that panel
found that a surgical procedure was medically necessary after the HMO said it was not, the law was attacked as being preempted by ERIS,\. The Supreme
Court held that the statute was a law "directecl toward" the insurance industry.
In Standard Instlrance Companl u. John Morriszft, the
statute requiring disapproval of plan provisions that
are "inconsistent, âmbiguous, or misleading" or which
"deceptively affect the risk purported to be assumed
in the general covetage of the conlracl'is aimed
solely at insurance policies. In the trial court and at
the 9d' Circuit, Standard argued that the statute
mereþ applies contra proferentem, the doctdne that
ambiguity in a contract is construed against the
clrafter, ancl that contra þroferentem is apphed under
state law to all contracts, not just insurance contracts.
Stanc{ard then reasoned that the statute is not directed
to insurance companies. Flowever, the core of the
statute prohibits clauses that "deceptively affect
the risk purported to be assumed in the general
coverage...," which prohibition is directed only at
insurance poJicies and not other contracts. Judge
Molloy followed the Supreme Court precedents in
determining that John Morrison's conduct in prohibiting discretionary clauses in Montanahealth plans,"...
is the stuff of garden variety insurance regulation
through the imposition of standard poJicy terms,"
quoting Rush Prudential.36 Molloy simply found that
disapproval of the discretionary clauses in ERISA
plans "is directed at entities engaged in insurance."
The second determination, whether disapproval
entities.3a

insurance so âs to be protected from ERiSA preemption
under the savings clause:

Offering

of these requirements.

i
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l1

of the clauses "substantially

affects

the risk pooling ârrângement," has
hinged on the defìrution of risk pooling. The industry argues that the term

"risk pooling" is an acttntizl term
peculiar to the insurance industry,
which is the sole àù:,itet of its application. Standard argued at length in
Montana Federal District Court that
risk pooJing meâns the act by which
insurance actuaties decide in which
risk classification the insured is
placed. Standard's contention is that,
once that classifìcation is made, the
risk pool is set, and nothing that
happens after that can affect risk
pooling. Consequently, the company's
decisions under the discretionary
clause after the insured suffers a loss

cannot substantiah affect the risk

pooling

^rt^ngemenl

However, this does not âccord
with the United States Supreme
Court's pronouncem ent in Kentucþ
Ass'n that "it suffìces that they [the
statutes] substantially affect the risk

pooling arcàngement between the
insurer and the insured." The court
there defined "risk pooJing" as
altering "the scope of permissible
bargains between insurers and
insuteds."37 The Kentøcþt Ass'n court

held that a statute there which expanded the number of providers
from whom an insurer could receive
health services "altered the scope of
permissible bargains between insurers
and insureds" so âs to affect the risk

pooling arrøflgerr'ents. Jim Hunt,
counsel for Morrison in the Standard
Insurance Company case, ably argued
that Morrison's prohibition of the
discretionary clauses altered the permissible bargatn between the insurers
and the insureds in Montana. No
longer could the plan agreement
which is the subject of the bargin
contain a discretionary clause, and
Judge Molloy found that prohibition
"alters the scope of permissible
batgains between insurers and
insuteds."38 Hence, his quote from
Rush Prudentsal that "this is the stuff
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garden vairety insurance regulation through the imposition of

S 33-1-502

standard policy terms."3e

scheme. Standard even impJied that
Judge Molloy found Morrison's statu-

Ptogress and Status

of the

Litigation in Montana
Standatd Insurance Company
could have litigated the issue of the

discretionary clause in some of the
most populous venues in the nation,
New Yotk, California, or Illinois,
where insurance commissioners
banned the clause. One cannot help
speculating that the company chose
Montana Federal Court as its venue
for challenging authority of an insurance commissioner on the belief that
the courts here would be more
friendly to their position or perhaps
too unsophisticated to deal with it.
There is a litde humor in that choice
given the insurance expertise of the
Montana coufts, the consumer orientation of Commissioner Morrison,
and the cadre of zealous plaintìffs'
insurance counsel like Jim Hunt who

inhabit the

state.

Standard fìled suit

for declantory

and injunctive relief in the Helena
Division of the Montâna Federal
District Court on September 26,
2006, and in the Montana FirstJudicial District Court in Lewis and Clark
County at the same time. ,{fter discovery in the federal suit, the parties
submitted the case on cross molions

for summary judgment. On February
27, 2008,Judge Molloy denied
Standard Insurance Company's
motion and granted Commissioner
Morrison's motion concluding that
Morrison's action in prohibiting the
discretionary clause "is the straight
forward regulation of insurance, a
matter ERISA expressly saves from
preemption."ao That decision is on
appeal to the 9ú Circuit and has been
fully briefed and argued byJim Hunt
on behalf of the Commissioner.
Standard shifted its argument at the
9ú Circuit expanding its contenúon
that Morrison's act of prohibiting
the discretionary clause under MCA

is actually a remedy that
conflicts with ERISlt's remedial

tory interpretation conflicted with
ERISA, but Molly actually found the
opposite, saylng Morrison's disapproval of discretionary clauses ¿'does
not implicate ERISlfs enforcement
scheme at alJ., and is no different
from the types of substantive state
regulation of insurance contract
fthe Supreme Court has] in the past
permitted to survive preemption."4l
The state couft action also went
down on cross motions for summary

judgment the issue there being
whether Morrison's decision that the
discretionary clause,violated MC,\
S 33-1-502 was correct.a2Judge
Honzel, quoted Standard's Grant of
Discretion clause which provided,
'qX/e will pay benefits under the
Group Policy if we decide that you
are entitled to them... In exercising
our discretiori, we must act pfudently
and in the interest of all Members."
Honzel noted with approval the California Superior Courtt holding that
such a discretionary clause renders
tlre insurer's promise to pay uncertairì,
ambþous, misleading, and illusory,
and he held that Standard's clause was
ambiguous and inconsistent so as to
violate the starute.a3 That decision
was not appealed. Hence, the remaining issue pending before the 9ú Circuit is whether Morrison's prohibitìon
of disctetionary clauses under the
Montana statutes is regulation of
insurance saved from the preemptìon
of ERISA.

Conclusion
Perhaps there is some hope on
the horizon. Recently, in Metropolitan
Lile lm Co. u. G/enn,.128 S.C,t.2343
(2008), the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that "a plan admjnistrator that
both evaluateq and pays claims operates undet a conflict of interest" and
pondered how a court could account
for such a conflict of interest. Glenn,
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it seems patently
obvious that a for-profìt insutance
company gets to keep more of the
ptemium dollar paid by the employer
when the insurer denies a plan
participant's claim for plan benefìts,
the Supreme Court stumbled when
cletermining the standard of review
federal courts should apply when
reviewing such a conflicted denial of
plan benefìts to a plan part-icipant.
The Supreme Court did not do away
with the abuse of discretion standarcl
and adopt instead a de nouo standard
as it should have done. Instead, the
majority, after much dithering on
what to do, approved the old abuse
of discretion standard but directed
lower courts to take into account as
f^ctor the conFlict of interest in
^
reviewing the decision of the plan
administrator. In short, the holding ìn
Clenn does nothing more than affirrr'
the status quo with regard to the
ERISA standarcl of review whjle
tecognizing that there does appear
to be a conflict of interest for plan
administrators who fund the plan
at 2347. Whtle

benefìts.

The remarkable power imbalance
bet\x,een insureds ancl insurers under
ERISA, is most apparent in the insurers' jnsertion of the discrerionary
clauses and the courts' consequerrt
cleference to decisions made under

those clauses. Thc ultimate unFairness
of denying de nouo review and
requiring a showing of abuse of
discretion where the insurer has
unreasonably withheld or denied a
benefit prompted the NAIC to draft
ancl recommend rules prohibiting the

discretionary clause.
Given the vast economic benefit
to the insurers in arming their plans
with a clause so antithetical to the
v¡elfare of the plan benefìciaries, the
prohibition of the clause has sparked
the important htigation now at the
9ú Circuit and possibly headed for
the United States Supreme Court. If
the Commissioners who have been

forthright enough to ban the

clauses

can prevail, a great blow will have
been struck for insurance consumers

of

health, disability, and acciclent

plans. May the force be with them!

ADDENDUM
After this article was submitted
for publication, the 9ù Circuit on
September 14,2009 {ilecl its decision
in Montowr u. Llartford Liþ dv Accident
bt¡ørance Compary¡, Q:07 -cv-0521. 5-

DSF-RZ). There, Hartford was both
the clisability plan administrator and
the insurer ancl inserted a discretionary clause intt-r its plan. Flartford
terminated the ERIS,\ disabilty benefìts of Montour who qualified for
Social Security disabitity by reason of
significant psychiatric disorders as
wcll as orthopedjc problems. After
starting benefìts, Hartfotd conducted
sutveillance with no signifìcant result
and hired multiple consulting experts
to gain opinions that Montour coulcl
do Jight or sedentary work. The
experts conductccl "pure paper"
reviews and no physical exâms.
Hartforclt resulting terrninatjon
of benefìts was teviewed in fecleral
district court under an abuse of
cliscretion standard, and Hartford
was awarded summâry judgment.
The 9'h Circuit tevetsed, ordered

summâry judgment for Montour, ancl
reinstated his disability benefits. The
court reâsorred that Hartforcl's conflict oF interest moLivatcd its dccision
to terminâte Montour's benefits to
the point that it constituted an abuse
of administrative discretion. In reviewing the record frclm the clistrict
court, the 9'h Circuit concluded,
"Hartford's bias infiltrated the entire
administrative decision making process, which leads us to accord signifìcant weight to the conflict." In such
a weighty conflict, the 9ù Circuit
asserted that it still applies the abuse
of discretion standard but says that,
under that standard, if the conflict is
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substantìal, the denial constitutes an
abuse of adminismative discretion.
Montoar is salutafy because a weighty
conflict should exist in many discretionary clause cases where the disability benefits insurer is also the ERIS,\
plan administrâror.
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